Piron's axioms for a realistically interpreted quantum mechanics are analyzed in detail within the context of a formal mathematical structure expressed in the conventional set-theoretic idiom of mathematics. As a result, some of the serious misconceptions that have encouraged recent criticisms of Piron's axioms are exposed.

Background: The traditional approach to resolving ethics concerns may not address underlying organisational issues involved in the evolution of these concerns. This represents a missed opportunity to improve quality of care “upstream”. The purpose of this study was to understand better which organisational issues may contribute to ethics concerns. Methods: Directed content analysis was used to review ethics consultation notes from an academic children’s hospital from 1996 to 2006 (N = 71). The analysis utilised 18 categories of organisational issues (...) derived and modified from published quality improvement protocols. Results: Organisational issues were identified in 68 of the 71 (96%) ethics consult notes across a range of patient settings and reasons for consultation. Thirteen of the 18 categories of organisational issues were identified and there was a median of two organisational issues per consult note. The most frequently identified organisational issues were informal organisational culture (eg, collective practices and approaches to situations with ethical dimensions that are not guided by policy), policies and procedures (eg, staff knows policy and/or procedural guidelines for an ethical concern but do not follow it) and communication (eg, communication about critical information, orders, or hand-offs repeatedly does not occur among services). Conclusions: Organisational issues contribute to ethical concerns that result in clinical ethics consults. Identifying and addressing organisational issues such as informal culture and communication may help decrease the recurrence of future similar ethics concerns. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject by Denis DŽANIĆD. J. HobbsDŽANIĆ, Denis. Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject. Cham: Springer, 2023. x + 236 pp. Cloth, $119.99Denis Džanić’s Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility, despite its superficially historical focus on a specific period of collaboration between Edmund Husserl and his somewhat wayward protégé Eugen Fink, addresses key (...) systematic issues in transcendental phenomenology, namely, how the act of phenomenologizing should be understood in connection with the specific human beings who aim to become phenomenologists, and what the answer to this question tells us about both the genuine subject of phenomenology and the motivation for phenomenologizing. These questions are important for our understanding of not only the historical development of phenomenology but also the practice and goals of phenomenology—specifically, for a conception of phenomenologizing as a project in which we, as particular, historical, empirical figures, might want to engage.Much of the book focuses on laying the groundwork for understanding these complicated issues both historically and systematically. Džanić does an admirable job of tracing the rapidly evolving interactions between Husserl and Fink, both as intellectual collaborators on this philosophical project and as a pair of very human figures who ultimately found themselves pursuing quite different solutions to the problems of the subject and origin of phenomenology. He focuses particularly on the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, Fink’s attempt to extend Husserl’s famous text to include a phenomenology of the act of phenomenologizing itself (including Husserl’s marginal comments on the text), although he draws on a number of other significant texts and manuscripts (mostly Husserl’s, albeit with an extended aside on Heidegger) wherever they are helpful for explicating the complex evolution of Husserl’s thought on the subject. Admittedly, the book thus takes on a challenging task—both because of the difficult nature of this topic and because of the obscurity of the technical terms required to discuss it. However, despite the necessarily enigmatic character of the relevant language, Džanić’s attempts to explore the main outlines of this issue are worthwhile, particularly due to his ability to resist the temptation to view Husserl’s thought here as monolithic.In the early chapters, Džanić explicates in detail the rather complicated solution that Fink proposed to this difficulty, namely, the abandonment (to some extent) of the ultimately human origin of phenomenology in favor of a fundamentally nonhuman (and eventually meontic) conception of the transcendental ego, which generated a great deal of elaborate and (at least in the Sixth Meditation) inadequately supported speculation. For Fink, both the motivation to phenomenologize and the act of phenomenologizing itself ultimately stem from a source that is fundamentally prior to—in a(n onto)logical rather than temporal sense—any empirical ego or empirical act of phenomenologizing, a source that merely “enworlds” itself (in various complicated senses that Džanić does [End Page 145] an admirable job of clarifying) in the apparently anthropologistic, everyday world of individual phenomenologists. Džanić calls this interpretation of phenomenology Fink’s “epistemological anti-humanism,” and it serves as the basis for one potential (radically anti-Heideggerian but nevertheless somewhat disappointing) solution to the question of why we should phenomenologize at all. As Džanić notes, this solution was at least briefly taken up by Fink’s mentor Husserl himself, although the degree to which Husserl actually endorsed this path beyond the level of a fleeting flirtation remains questionable. Ultimately, as Džanić rightly highlights and as becomes abundantly clear in Husserl’s (often rather scathing) notes on Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, he abandoned this interpretation.Accordingly, in the later chapters of the book, Džanić traces Husserl’s ultimate development of a quite different solution to the problems of the origin and motivation of phenomenology—a solution that, unlike his brief foray into Finkian grandeur, views the act of phenomenologizing as essentially rooted in human possibility (that is, as part of the famous lifeworld that features so prominently in Husserl’s work, especially in the Crisis and other late texts). After his collaboration with and... (shrink)

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

This is a well-chosen anthology selected from the Levy translation but topically arranged according to Karl Schlechta's German edition. Professor Clive's rather elegant introduction, despite occasional lapses into apparent rhetoric, is penetrating. Clive interprets Nietzsche "dialectically," in terms of Nietzsche's "love-hate relationship to himself." Nietzsche's contributions to philosophy, philology, artistic criticism, and to the literature of stunning aphorisms are all duly noted. But Nietzsche emerges as typically modern in that his own irony, at his best moments, was itself subject to (...) a lucid scepticism.—D. J. B. (shrink)

We assume that a statute permitting physician assisted death has been passed. We note that the rationale for the passage of such a statute would be respect for individual autonomy, the avoidance of suffering and the possibility of death with dignity. We deal with two moral issues that will arise once such a law is passed. First, we argue that the rationale for passing an assistance in dying law in the first place provides a justification for assisting patients to die (...) who are motivated by altruistic reasons as well as patients who are motivated by reasons of self-interest. Second, we argue that the reasons for passing a physician assisted death law in the first place justify extending the law to cover some nonterminal patients as well as terminal patients. (shrink)

Georges J. D. Moyal - Deux notes sur l' «imparfaite science» du geometre athee - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 277-300 Deux notes sur l'« imparfaite science » du géomètre athée Georges J. D. Moyal Deux questions. La Ve Méditation de Descartes vise à démontrer que l'existence d'un Dieu vérace est la condition nécessaire de toute science. En effet, Descartes y écrit ceci : « . . . je remarque (...) que la certitude de toutes les autres choses en dépend si absolument [sc. de l'existence de Dieu], que sans cette connaissance il est impossible de pouvoir jamais rien savoir parfaitement. » Ce qui le mène, bien entendu, d'abord à reconnaître que « . . . si j'ignorais qu'il y eût un Dieu [ . . . ] je n'aurais jamais une vraie et certaine science d'aucune chose que ce soit, mais seulement de vagues et inconstantes opinions » et par là même, à refuser ensuite cette parfaite science au géomètre athée : « Or, qu'un athée puisse connaître clairement que les trois angles d'un triangle sont égaux à deux droits, je ne le nie pas ; mais je maintiens seulement qu'il ne le connaît pas par une vraie et certaine science, parce que toute connaissance qui peut être rendue douteuse ne doit pas être appelée science . . . » Il faut reconnaître qu'il y a à nos yeux, aujourd'hui, quelque chose de surprenant à ce que le géomètre athée se voie ainsi refuser cette parfaite science.. (shrink)

The traces of real, that is, ancient, rival versions of Terence's lines are not so pronounced as of Plautus' lines. Professor Lindsay has drawn attention to a possible instance at Hec. 468 . Another seems to be Andr. 532 , if I am right in supposing that the text used by Donatus had ipsum Chremem. A trace of the variant survives in the unmetrical δ-setting ipsum obuiam Chremem DGL. The text of the other minuscule MSS. has ipsum obuiam. A is (...) not in evidence for this part of Andria. Had it too ipsum Chremem ? (shrink)

These comments start, as they must, from the text of I. Hilberg in the Vienna corpus.1 This was the first properly critical edition of the Letters,and has not been superseded. It is, however, not without its limitations. In establishing his text Hilberg considered only a few MSS for each letter: for epist.1, seven, and for epist.107, six, in one of which the letter is represented twice, though in neither case is it complete.Hilberg promised a volume of prolegomena and indices to (...) accompany his text;2 but it seems that he died before it could appear, and we do not know how he assessed his MSS, or how many he consulted before making his choice.What we do know is that those on which he relied form a very small proportion of those which exist.B.Lambert′s catalogue of Jerome MSS3 lists 138 for epist.1 and 145 for epist.107, of which ten and thirteen respectively are dated ninth-to-tenth-century or earlier - and Lambert is well aware that his list cannot pretend to be exhaustive.4 Furthermore, there is some reason to doubt the accuracy of the collations which form the basis of Hilberg′s edition.5 It is evident that much work remains to be done before a definitive edition can be produced.Meanwhile Hilberg′s text is the best we have, and where I cite MSS I follow the readings of his apparatus criticus.6 The phrase ‘the MSS’ refers, in this article, only to those which Hilberg utilised. (shrink)

The origins of the unrest among the Pannonian legions in A.D. 14 are easily discerned. The great war in Illyricum of A.D. 6–9 involved the legions in a series of extremely arduous campaigns extending across the western half of the Balkan Peninsula, in particular the impenetrable forests of Bosnia and the rugged karst of Dalmatia. The nearness of this area to Italy made the war a great crisis in the reign of Augustus: conquest of Illyricum was the keystone of Augustus' (...) northern frontier policy and no efforts were spared to achieve this. Advances in Germany could be determined from expediency but the subjugation of the Bosnian tribes was a necessity. During the war the need for men was so great that conscription was introduced in Italy and even freedmen were enlisted when ordinary citizen volunteers were not forthcoming. Cassius Dio speaks of the low morale and outbreaks of mutiny in the army of Tiberius during the last season of the war. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide a preliminary outline of a theory of identity. The first section addresses what the sociologist Niklas Luhmann has called ‘the problem of identity’, or, in other words, the mind–society (rather than the mind–body) problem: In how far can the internal (psychological) self and the external (social) persona be integrated into a unit? The second section of the essay briefly defines a basic vocabulary of a theory of identity. ‘Identity’ is understood as the existentially necessary formation (...) of a coherence between the ‘self’ (the ‘I’ as it is experienced in thoughts and feelings), its body and its social ‘persona’ (the individual person with its social attributes). Three different major paradigms of identity formation are distinguished from one another: a sincere identity is constructed through a firm commitment of the self to its social roles; an authentic identity is constructed through the creation of a social persona on the basis of one’s unique and original self; a ‘profilic’ identity, as we call it, is shaped by successfully presenting a personal profile under conditions of second-order observation as they prevail, for instance, in the social media, but also in other contemporary social systems. In the third section of the essay, we present a sketch of the historical sequence of these three paradigms of identity. Although these paradigms are not mutually exclusive and can coexist, it seems that sincerity flourished in pre-modern society, while authenticity came to prominence along with the functional differentiation of modern society and is now, along with the increased significance of second-order observation, gradually overshadowed by the influence of profilicity. (shrink)

Preoccupation with language is a notable feature of modern philosophy. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the influence of language on thought, and particularly its influence on philosophical thought, is a leading topic of philosophical discussion in this century. Every philosopher of any note, no matter what his general interests may be, has found it necessary to define his attitude to this problem. The attitude usually adopted consists of an admission that language does have a great influence (...) on thought, and on philosophical thought in particular. More accurately, it is claimed that the structure and grammatical categories, and perhaps the vocabulary, natural to a particular language, determine the lines of thought and speculation open to any thinker who uses that language .This determination is unimportant in many cases, because the results of our thinking are usually subject to check by appeal to empirical facts. In philosophical thinking, however, no such check is available by the very nature of the case. Accordingly, we cannot tell if the difficulty or apparent insolubility of a philosophical problem is due to the problem itself, or simply due to inadequacies in our language. In a different language, so it is suggested, the problem which is difficult for us might very easily be solved. Indeed, there might not then be any such problem, or its solution might be self-evident in this other language. This is the moderate attitude to the language difficulty in philosophy, and it is fair to say that it is almost universally adopted at the present day. In some circles it has acquired the prestige of an indisputable dogma. (shrink)